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Abstract
In the medical sphere, personal and medical informa-
tion is collected, stored, and transmitted for various pur-
poses, such as, continuity of care, rapid formulation
of diagnoses, and billing. Many of these operations
must comply with federal regulations like the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
To this end, we need a specification language that can
precisely capture the requirements of HIPAA. We also
need an enforcement engine that can enforce the pri-
vacy policies specified in the language. In the current
work, we evaluate eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) as a candidate specification lan-
guage for HIPAA privacy rules. We evaluate XACML
based on the set of features required to sufficiently ex-
press HIPAA, proposed by a prior work. We also discuss
which of the features necessary for expressing HIPAA
are missing in XACML. We then present high level de-
signs of how to enhance XACML’s enforcement engine
to support the missing features.
1 Introduction
Business organizations such as banks, hospitals, etc., col-
lect private information from their customers to perform
their business functions. They often use computer in-
formation systems to manage and manipulate the col-
lected private information of their customers. Govern-
ment regulations mandate how this information can be
used or disclosed by the organizations. For instance,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [8] mandates how the protected health infor-
mation (phi) of the patients collected by the health care
providers can be legally used or disclosed. Intentional
(or, unintentional) violations of these regulations can
cause heavy financial penalties and sanctions [16]. Thus,
it is desirable to have an expressive specification lan-
guage for expressing these privacy regulations. Further-
more, we need to have corresponding enforcement mech-
anism by which privacy policies like these can be effi-
ciently enforced.
OASIS’s eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) [18] is one of the most popular ac-
cess control specification languages. Along with the rich
specification language, XACML [18] also has a robust
enforcement engine that can enforce policies specified in
the language. Although, XACML is an expressive speci-
fication language it lacks features for sufficiently spec-
ifying privacy policies like HIPAA. This is natural as
XACML is designed for specifying access control poli-
cies instead of privacy policies like HIPAA. The focus
of the current work is to assess XACML’s adequacy for
expressing HIPAA. More precisely, we describe what
features a specification language requires to sufficiently
specify HIPAA. We also discuss which of these neces-
sary features XACML possesses and also propose exten-
sions of XACML to support the missing features.
One of the apparent advantages of extending XACML
to support privacy policies like HIPAA is that, one uni-
form specification language and enforcement mechanism
can be used to specify and enforce the access control
policies and the privacy policies of the system. Managing
the access control policies and the privacy policies dif-
ferently is cumbersome as an action can be mandated by
both policies. However, if we use XACML for express-
ing both policies then XACML’s enforcement mecha-
nism will combine the permissibility decision of an ac-
tion by using the policy combination algorithms (PCAs).
Furthermore, organizations can have their own business
privacy policy on top of the federal privacy regulations.
In this case, the organization’s privacy policy would be
the composition of their business privacy policy and the
federal privacy regulations. This composition of privacy
policies can be very easily achieved by XACML.
Contributions. In the current work, we evaluate
XACML as a possible specification language for ex-
pressing HIPAA. To the best of our knowledge, the cur-
rent work is the first to consider XACML as a possi-
ble specification language for HIPAA. Our evaluation of
XACML as a candidate specification language is based
on a set of features required for expressing HIPAA,
proposed by DeYoung et al. [4]. In our evaluation of
XACML, we found out that XACML has some rich
enough features (e.g., attributes, policy/policy rule com-
bination, etc.) to support HIPAA. However, it lacks some
other necessary features (e.g., event history, obligations,
subjective belief, reference to other rules, etc.) to ade-
quately capture the HIPAA privacy rules. We believe that
the support for the missing features will enable XACML
to specify HIPAA.
To support event history, we propose a history man-
ager that keeps track of important events that have hap-
pened in the past and can influence the permissibility of
certain disclosure or usage. To this end, we analyze the
policy to manually figure out the events that are neces-
sary to be stored in our history (a relational database).
We also require that the user requesting an access (use
or disclose) provides the intended purpose and also the
subjective beliefs.
Roadmap. Section 2 reviews the backgrounds necessary
to understand our contributions. In Section 3 we discuss
the different features necessary to specify HIPAA and we
discuss which of these features are missing in XACML
in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the extension of
XACML necessary for our purpose and its enforcement
architecture. Related works are discussed in Section 6.
Section 7 discusses our future work and concludes.
2 Background
In this section we briefly summarize HIPAA privacy
rules and XACML.
2.1 Overview of HIPAA
We now briefly overview the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 also re-
ferred to as Public Law 104-191. According to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) the goal
of the HIPAA privacy regulation is to ensure that con-
sumers can access their health information and also to
protect their information from unauthorized disclosure.
More specifically, Part 164 of HIPAA deals with the
security and privacy aspect of the regulation. In this
work, we primarily analyze subpart E of Part 164, which
deals with protecting individually identifiable health in-
formation, covering §164.502 to §164.528. These rules
precisely specify the security and privacy requirements
that is applicable to “covered entities” with respect to
protected health information (phi). As defined by HIPAA
and the HHS, covered entities include health plans,
health care clearinghouses, such as billing services and
community health information systems, and health care
providers that transmit health care data in a way that is
regulated by HIPAA. Protected health information (phi)
refers to individually identifiable health information ex-
cept a few cases where such information falls under the
jurisdiction of other federal regulations such as the Fam-
ily Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).
The privacy rules regulate the following kinds of ac-
tions: (1) Usage of the phi within the covered entity it-
self. (2) Disclosure of phi to some other entity.
Furthermore, the purposes for which the covered en-
tity (or, any other entity) is using or disclosing the phi
is also referred in the privacy rules. The following is an
incomplete list of purposes that are used: treatment; pay-
ment; health care operations; creating de-identified phi;
communicate; marketing; reporting to public health au-
thority; health oversight.
When disclosing phi, the role of the entity to which
the disclosure is made is also important. An incom-
plete list of the different roles that are referred in the
HIPAA rules include: individual (i.e., the person whose
phi is about); representative of an individual; business
associates of a covered entity; healthcare provider; an
attorney representing whistleblower; group health plan;
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO); public health
care authority; public health or government authority au-
thorized by law to receive child abuse report; a person
who may have been exposed to a communicable disease;
employer of an individual; a family member, other rel-
ative, or a close personal friend of an individual, or any
other person identified by the individual; a person sub-
ject to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated
activity.
The HIPAA rules also often refer to other documents
and contracts among the entities involved with the appli-
cable disclosure. We briefly summarize these documents
and contracts in the following discussion.
Privacy notice. According to the privacy rules, when
a privacy notice is required, an access must be consis-
tent with the privacy notice, in addition to following pri-
vacy rule (§164.502(i)). “A covered entity that is re-
quired by §164.520 to have a notice may not use or dis-
close protected health information in a manner inconsis-
tent with such notice. A covered entity that is required
by §164.520(b)(1)(iii) to include a specific statement in
its notice if it intends to engage in an activity listed in
§164.520(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(C), may not use or disclose pro-
tected health information for such activities, unless the
required statement is included in the notice.” Accord-
ing to the above clause, an organization must check each
access against the privacy notice. Therefore, privacy no-
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tices should be encoded as policies that must also autho-
rize a request for it to be allowed. When an organization
has multiple privacy notices (for example, Google had
over 70 different privacy policies before consolidating
them), then it is necessary to remember for each patient
which policy encodes the privacy notice for that patient
and checks with that policy.
Authorizations. Accesses (use or disclose) to phi not
explicitly authorized by the privacy rules can still be al-
lowed when a valid authorization from the individual
is obtained for the specified purpose. This is explicitly
mentioned in the privacy rule §164.508 which specifies
that: “Except as otherwise permitted or required by this
subchapter, a covered entity may not use or disclose pro-
tected health information without an authorization that
is valid under this section. When a covered entity ob-
tains or receives a valid authorization for its use or dis-
closure of protected health information, such use or dis-
closure must be consistent with such authorization.” To
enforce this clause, authorizations signed by individuals
also need to be encoded as policies and checked against.
Contracts and Restrictions. The HIPAA privacy rules
in §164.522 requires that a covered entity must permit
an individual to request that the covered entity restrict:
(A) Uses or disclosures of protected health information
about the individual to carry out treatment, payment, or
health care operations; and (B) Disclosures permitted
under §164.510(b). A covered entity is not required to
agree to a restriction, but if it agrees to it, it must respect
the restriction.
Furthermore, the HIPAA privacy rules in §164.510 al-
lows a covered entity to use or disclose protected health
information without the written consent or authorization
of the individual as described by §164.506 and §164.508,
respectively, provided that the individual is informed in
advance of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity
to agree to or prohibit or restrict the disclosure in accor-
dance with the applicable requirements of this section.
The covered entity may orally inform the individual and
obtain the individual’s oral agreement or objection to a
use or disclosure permitted by this section.
2.2 XACML
Architecture. The main components of the XACML
architecture include a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a
Policy Decision Point (PDP), a Policy Information Point
(PIP), a Policy Administration Point (PAP), and obliga-
tions service. The PEP performs access control, by re-
ceiving decision requests, consulting the PDP for autho-
rization decision, and enforcing the decisions. The PDP
evaluates applicable policies and yields authorization de-
cisions, together with obligations and advice, if any. The
PIP acts as a source of attribute values, such as sub-







Figure 1: XACML schema of policy set, policy and rule
in BNF form
administrates policies and policy sets and makes them
available to the PDP. The obligations service handles
obligations forwarded by the PEP. However, XACML
does not specify how PIP, PAP and obligations service
should behave and how they should be implemented.
Rules, Policies, and Policy-sets. Both XACML 2.0
and 3.0 [18] define three levels of policy elements: rules,
policies, and policy-sets. A rule is the most basic policy
element; it has three main components: a target, a con-
dition, and an effect. The target defines a set of subjects,
resources, and actions that the rule applies to; the con-
dition specifies restrictions on the attributes in the target
and refines the applicability of the rule; the effect is ei-
ther Permit, in which case we call the rule a permit
rule, or Deny, in which case we call it a deny rule. If
a request satisfies both the rule target and rule condition,
the rule is applicable to the request and yields the deci-
sion specified by the effect element; otherwise, the rule
is not applicable to the request and yields the decision
NotApplicable.
Unlike XACML 2.0, XACML 3.0 allows one to spec-
ify obligations and advice in a rule, so the rule would
return a decision together with a set of (possibly empty)
obligations and advice if it is applicable to a request.
Each obligation represents functions to be executed in
conjunction with the enforcement of an authorization de-
cision. Advice is newly added in XACML 3.0, which is
a supplementary piece of information provided together
with a decision, and it is like an optional obligation,
which can be safely ignored by the PEP without .
A policy consists of four main components: a target, a
rule-combining algorithm (RCA), a set of rules, and obli-
gations/advice. The policy target decides whether a re-
quest is applicable to the policy and it has a similar struc-
ture as the rule target. The RCA specifies how the deci-
sions from the rules are combined to yield one decision.
A policy-set also has four main components: a target, a
policy-combining algorithm (PCA), a set of sub-policies,
and obligations/advice. A sub-policy can be either be a
policy or a policy-set. The PCA specifies how the results
of evaluating the sub-policies are combined to yield a de-
cision. Figure 1 shows the schema of policy set, policy
and rule in BNF form of the base XACML specification
language.
Policy Combining Algorithms. XACML 2.0 and 3.0
have a number of standard RCAs and PCAs. Us-
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ing “Permit-overrides”, “Deny-overrides”, and “First-
applicable” among them are helpful and sufficient for
combining HIPAA policies/rules.
3 Features for HIPAA Specification
In this section, we inventory and briefly summarize the
features, proposed by DeYoung et al. [4, 5], that a policy
specification language requires to sufficiently capture the
HIPAA privacy rules.
Attributes. Each HIPAA privacy rule mandating a dis-
closure or usage can restrict the sender’s, receiver’s, the
subject’s, and the message’s current attributes. For in-
stance, the HIPAA privacy rule §164.502(a)(1)(i) spec-
ifies that: “A covered entity is permitted to use or dis-
close protected health information as follows: To the in-
dividual”. According to this regulation (when consider-
ing a disclosure action), the sender’s role attribute must
be covered entity, the receiver’s and the subject’s role at-
tribute must be individual, and the information in ques-
tion is the subject’s phi attribute.
Attribute Inference Policy. Attribute inference poli-
cies specify whether a certain individual has a spe-
cific attribute based on conditions on his current at-
tributes. Consider the HIPAA privacy policy rule in
§164.502(a)(1) that allows a covered entity to send a pa-
tient’s phi to the patient’s personal representative. While
evaluating this policy rule, one might need to check
whether a certain individual p1 is the personal represen-
tative of the patient p2. Attribute inference policies can
specify under what circumstances p1 can be considered
a personal representative of p2. An example of such an
attribute inference policy can be found in §164.502(g)(2)
of HIPAA. It specifies that p1 can be considered the per-
sonal representative of p2 when p2 has the authority to
make health care decisions for p1 where p1 is either an
adult or an emancipated minor.
Past Events. The HIPAA privacy rules restrict a request
for disclosure or usage of a patient’s protected health in-
formation (phi) based on some events on the past. Con-
sider the regulation §164.502(e)(1)(i) which mentions
that: “A covered entity may disclose protected health in-
formation to a business associate and may allow a busi-
ness associate to create or receive protected health infor-
mation on its behalf, if the covered entity obtains satis-
factory assurance that the business associate will appro-
priately safeguard the information.” According to this
regulation, the covered entity can disclose a patient’s phi
to its business associate when it has already received sat-
isfactory assurance from its business associate regarding
the safeguarding of the phi.
Obligations with Deadlines. The HIPAA privacy rules
also impose obligatory restrictions on the covered en-
tity. Furthermore, the obligations have specific deadlines
within which the obligation needs to be carried out. Con-
sider the §164.524(b)(2)(i) of HIPAA, which mentions:
“the covered entity must act on a request for access no
later than 30 days after the receipt of the request”. Here,
the covered entity is obligated to act within 30 days after
it has received a request for access from an individual.
Purpose of Usage or Disclosure. The HIPAA privacy
rules restrict certain usage or disclosure requests based
on the purpose of that action. For instance, the HIPAA
privacy rule in §164.506(c)(1) specifies that: “A covered
entity may use or disclose protected health information
for its own treatment, payment, or health care opera-
tions.”. This HIPAA privacy rule allows a covered entity
to use or disclose phi of patient for the purpose of either
its own treatment, payment, or health care.
Subjective Beliefs. The HIPAA privacy rules allows a
certain disclosure or usage of a patient’s phi based on the
covered entity’s subjective belief or professional judge-
ment. An example of such a HIPAA privacy rule can be
found in §164.512(f)(5) of the regulation. It states that:
“A covered entity may disclose to a law enforcement of-
ficial protected health information that the covered en-
tity believes in good faith constitutes evidence of crimi-
nal conduct that occurred on the premises of the covered
entity”. This rule allows a covered entity to disclose phi
of a patient to the police for reporting a crime on premise
and additional believes the phi can be used as evidence.
Reference to Other Laws/Rules. The HIPAA privacy
rules also restrict a certain disclosure or usage of a pa-
tient’s phi based on other laws and also others rules (sec-
tions and paragraphs) of HIPAA. One example of the
HIPAA privacy rule referring to another law can be found
in §164.512(a)(1) which specifies that: “ A covered en-
tity may use or disclose protected health information to
the extent that such use or disclosure is required by law
and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited
to the relevant requirements of such law”. The HIPAA
privacy rule §164.502(a)(1)(ii) can serve as an example
where one rule of HIPAA refers to another HIPAA pri-
vacy rule. It specifies that: “A covered entity is permitted
to use or disclose protected health information as fol-
lows: For treatment, payment, or health care operations,
as permitted by and in compliance with §164.506;”.
Policy/Policy Rule Combination. HIPAA has differ-
ent types of privacy rules based on the restrictions they
impose. More precisely, (i) some of the HIPAA pri-
vacy rules allow certain disclosure, (ii) some of the
HIPAA privacy rules prohibit certain disclosure to take
place, (iii) some of the rules allow certain disclosure
when certain condition is satisfied, and (iv) some of the
rules require certain disclosure to take place. To check
whether certain disclosure or usage is in compliant with
the HIPAA privacy rules, one should be able to consult
all the above types of privacy rules to get decisions and
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combine them to get one consistent decision. An exam-
ple of type (i) rules can be found in §164.506(c)(2) of
HIPAA, which specifies that: “A covered entity may dis-
close protected health information for treatment activi-
ties of a health care provider”. The HIPAA privacy rule
§164.502(g)(3)(ii)(B) demonstrates the type (ii) rules. It
specifies that: “If, and to the extent, prohibited by an ap-
plicable provision of State or other law, including ap-
plicable case law, a covered entity may not disclose,
or provide access in accordance with §164.524 to, pro-
tected health information about an unemancipated mi-
nor to a parent, guardian, or other person acting in loco
parentis; and...”. An example of type (iii) privacy rules
can be found in §164.508(a)(1) of HIPAA which spec-
ifies that: “Notwithstanding any provision of this sub-
part, other than the transition provisions in §164.532,
a covered entity must obtain an authorization for any
use or disclosure of psychotherapy notes,...”. Example
of type (iv) rule can be found in the HIPAA privacy rule
§164.502(a)(2)(ii) which specifies that, “A covered en-
tity is required to disclose protected health information:
When required by the Secretary under subpart C of part
160 of this subchapter to investigate or determine the
covered entity’s compliance with this subpart.”.
4 Evaluating XACML for HIPAA
We identify the mismatches that occur when express-
ing HIPAA in XACML. These serve as the motivation
for future research and development of access control
specification languages. We use XACML as an example
of state-of-the-art access control language with enforce-
ment support.
Stateful Policies vs. Stateless Mechanism
XACML policies are largely stateless. Essentially
XACML provides a component that takes a request as
input, and returns a decision. The XACML architecture
puts forward keywords such as PEP, PDP, PAP, and PIP.
However, it does not suggest how to implement each of
PAP and PIP, let alone modeling their interactions.
When using XACML to encode a set of complicated
policies, all one can do is to create a stateless policy that
takes requests as inputs and give decisions as outputs.
Anything else is beyond the actual XACML standard.
The HIPAA privacy rules, however, goes beyond a sim-
ple policy providing answers to requests.
Obligations. Although XACML seems to integrate obli-
gations as part of it, it treats obligations largely as black
boxes, without specifying what an obligation should in-
clude and how to handle them. In short, XACML does
not assign any semantics to obligations, which we be-
lieve is necessary.
Event History. XACML is stateless and assumes any
stateful information (e.g, history) is kept outside the pol-
icy engine. One possibility is to use Condition semantics
of XACML 3.0 to handle history. However, one has to
assume that there exists a sophisticated component out-
side the policy engine that maintains relevant history in-
formation and knows exactly which part of the history
information is needed for a given request to put such in-
formation in the request context. In a sense, one has to
assume a policy engine beyond XACML to handle these
things. We believe that the decisions about how history
information are maintained and used are largely policy
driven, and should be handled together with access con-
trol policies, inside the XACML framework.
Policy-Directed Attribute Retrieval. In HIPAA, differ-
ent attributes need to be provided for different requests.
Deciding which attributes to retrieve, is often dictated by
the policy itself. XACML currently does not contain sup-
port for this operation.
Policy-Directed Policy Retrieval. As we have discussed
before, the HIPAA privacy rules can refer to other doc-
uments or contracts (e.g., privacy notice, authorization,
etc.) between the covered entity and the subject in ques-
tion. If such a document or contract exists, it can domi-
nate the response from the regular privacy rules. In that
sense, we can consider these documents or contracts as
separate policies and retrieve them when necessary. Cur-
rently, XACML does not support such interactions.
Interactive vs. Non-interactive Policy Evalu-
ation
Reading HIPAA, one gets the sense that policy evalua-
tion needs to be more interactive. For a disclosure re-
quest, depending on which justification one plans to use
for the disclosure, a different set of conditions need to be
checked. One cannot simply send a request and get back
a decision.
Purpose of Disclosure or Usage and Subject Beliefs.
The HIPAA regulation sometimes permits a disclosure or
usage of a patient’s phi based on the purpose or based on
the subject’s belief. However, deciding whether certain
disclosure or usage is requested for certain purposes, is
difficult. It is impossible to decide from the static context
of the request arguments. The same is true for subjective
beliefs. It is often difficult to decide subjective beliefs
without interacting with the requester.
Reference to Other Laws/Rules. As we have seen be-
fore, HIPAA privacy rules can refer to other HIPAA pri-
vacy rules and also other laws. As a result of which,
while evaluating a privacy rule we might have to evaluate
a different rule (referred in the original privacy rule) first
before making decision about the first rule. Currently,
XACML does not support such interactions between pol-
icy/policy rules.
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Attribute Inference vs. Authorization Deci-
sions
In XACML, all rules assign some kind of truth value to
a particular request, and one cannot write a rule/policy
assigning truth value to a query that is not an access re-
quest. For example, in HIPAA one condition for access-
ing phi is that the requester is a personal representative of
the patient. However, HIPAA has guidelines that dictate
whether someone should be considered to be a personal
representative. Ideally these conditions for deciding per-
sonal representative should also be specified as XACML
policies and rules. However, these policies and rules are
not about deciding the request, but about the inference
of some attribute relevant to the current decision. There-
fore, they cannot be expressed in current XACML.
Quantification Over Infinite Domains
As pointed out by existing work [2, 4–6], concise spec-
ification of the HIPAA privacy rules require quantifica-
tions over the infinite domains of the involved principals,
message attributes, messages, etc. XACML supports im-
plicit universal quantification (outer-most) of the sender,
receiver, subject, message, message attributes, etc., of the
use or disclosure action which the rule mandates. How-
ever, while specifying HIPAA privacy rules, the condi-
tion associated with a privacy rule can also have quantifi-
cations. Currently, XACML does not support the spec-
ification of the explicit quantifications appearing in the
condition of a rule.
5 Extensions of XACML to Support
HIPAA Policies
Inspired by Barth et al. [2], we divide the HIPAA privacy
regulation regarding disclosure or usage of a patient’s phi
into two types of privacy rules, allowing policy rules and
prohibitive policy rules. An allowing policy rule (e.g.,
§164.502(a)(1)(i), etc.) enables a disclosure or usage
whereas a prohibitive policy rule (e.g., §164.508(a)(2),
etc.) permits a disclosure only when its associate condi-
tion is satisfied. We describe how these rules are com-
bined in section 5.6. Each HIPAA policy rule regulat-
ing a disclosure or usage contains the following restric-
tions: (1) sender’s attributes, (2) recipient’s attribute, (3)
subject’s attribute (the individual whose phi is consid-
ered), (4) purpose of the disclosure, (5) the information
that is being disclosed (e.g., age, name, ssn, etc.), (6)
obligations, (7) history, and (8) other conditions. In this
section, we summarize how each of these are specified
in the extended XACML. Our proposed extensions are
based on the investigation of the HIPAA privacy rules
in §164.502-§164.514, §164.522, and §164.524. Note
that, the goal of this work is not completely specifying
and enforcing the HIPAA privacy rules rather evaluat-
ing XACML as a candidate for specifying and enforcing
HIPAA privacy rules.
Assumptions. We now discuss the assumptions wemake
while considering XACML as a specification language
for HIPAA. In our system, the actions of the system that
are regulated by the privacy policy are disclose (e.g., send
a message, send postal mail, etc.), use (e.g., read, write,
etc.), request (e.g., request from patient, etc.), and ac-
cess (e.g., patient accessing her own phi, etc.). More pre-
cisely, we only regulate disclosure or usage regarding to
the phi of a patient. We also assume that it is the re-
sponsibility of the sending user to tag the message with
the appropriate attributes (e.g., address, ssn, age, etc.)
based on the content of the message. Additionally, cur-
rent work makes the assumption that when an obligation
is incurred, the user incurring the obligation (obligatee)
will be permitted according to the privacy and access
control policy. However, this might not be the case. Re-
laxing this assumption and designing a static analysis of
the policy to check whether it has this desired property is
a subject of future work.
In the current work, we have abstracted away
some portions of HIPAA. Consider the regulation in
§164.502(g)(3)(ii)(A), that allows a covered entity to dis-
close the phi to the guardian provided that other laws al-
low it. It is not feasible to encode all possible applicable
laws in our language. As a result, we use an oracle (pos-
sibly a company attorney) to decide whether the disclo-
sure is allowed by other laws. We additionally assume
that the patient policies that the covered entity agrees to
comply with, is consistent with the HIPAA privacy rules.
5.1 Obligations
Sometimes HIPAA policies specify obligations required
to be performed by covered entities. For example, the
HIPAA regulation §164.524(b)(2)(i) says that the cov-
ered entity is obligated to act within 30 days after it
has received a request from an individual. As men-
tioned before, XACML’s support for obligations is not
rich enough to capture the obligatory requirements of
HIPAA. As a result, in the current work, we adopt
the obligation model by Li et al. [12] to support spec-
ification and enforcement of obligations in XACML.
Note that, there are other approaches to manage obliga-
tions [3, 6, 15], but the model by Li et al. [12] is a nat-
ural fit as it can readily be used with XACML without
any significant modifications. The key ideas of the state-
machine-based approach proposed in [12] are as follows.
An obligation is modeled as a state machine that commu-
nicates with the PEP using events. The PEP manages the
life-cycle of obligations. An obligation includes rulesets
to specify its responses to input events. These responses
include changing its state in response to events, which
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informs the PEP about what course of actions it should
take regarding the request, and generating events, which
inform the environment about what actions must be taken
to fulfill the obligation. Some of these actions are de-
ployment specific. These deployment specific actions are
implemented by obligation modules. Multiple obligation
modules can be attached to the PEP, each implementing
some actions. These obligation modules communicate
with the PEP and the obligations through an event inter-
face. The details of this approach can be referred to [12].
5.2 History Management
The HIPAA privacy regulation sometimes allows a cer-
tain disclosure or usage of a patient’s phi when certain
condition/event in the past (temporal condition) is true.
To facilitate this, we propose a history manager that
keeps track of important past events that might influence
the permissibility of a certain disclosure or usage. A his-
tory manager is a relational database that saves impor-
tant events and can be queried efficiently. In the example
above, whenever we receive a court order requesting the
phi of a certain patient, we would save this event on the
history manager. Now, in response to the court order,
if the covered entity attempts to send the required infor-
mation to the court, we check whether the covered entity
actually received a court order. We achieve this by check-
ing history table for an entry which is a court order that
the covered entity received. Note that, design of such his-
tory manager has been proposed in the literature [6, 10]
but we design it specifically for XACML and discuss its
interactions with PDP to make an access decision.
Recall that, the history condition of a policy rule can
contain quantifications over the domains of principal,
message, and message attribute. XACML cannot express
such quantifications. We overcome this by expressing the
history conditions as stored database procedures which
take arguments. In the rule specification, we refer to the
appropriate database procedure. We use events to pass
the proper arguments of the database procedure. We fol-
low the same approach for quantification in other ele-
ments of the conditions (e.g., attribute inference, etc.).
Now, to support event history in the condition of the pri-
vacy rules, we have to extend the <Policy> element of
XACML which we discuss just below.
5.3 Interactions with Users
The HIPAA regulation sometimes permits a disclosure or
usage of a patient’s phi based on the purpose or based on
the subject’s belief. However, deciding whether certain
disclosure or usage is requested for certain purposes, is
difficult. It is impossible to decide from the static con-
text of the request arguments. We follow the approach of
Lam et al. [11] and require that the user provides the pur-
pose as an argument of the request. We present a list of
possible purposes to the user and she chooses the appro-
priate one. Automatically determining whether a certain
action is for some certain purpose [17] is out of the scope.
It is also not trivial how to model subjective belief of a
principal in a computer information system. Thus, when-
ever we try to evaluate a policy rule that allows a usage
or disclosure based on a subject’s belief, we require ad-
ditional information from the principal requesting the ac-
tion. The additional information in this case is the infor-
mation about the subjective belief.
Extension of the <Policy> element. In order to sup-
port interactions with users during policy evaluations,
the <Policy> element in XACML needs to be extended.
As aforementioned, some attribute values like subjec-
tive beliefs might be missing when checking whether
a condition is satisfied, and thus user inputs might be
required. In this case, the policy evaluation has to be
stopped, and events should be sent out to inform users
to provide the missing information. And then user in-
puts, if provided, will be sent back also by events. One
possible extension is that attributes that will be required
during the policy evaluation are specified in an optional
<RequiredAttributeList> element. Hence we extend the












The Source of a <RequiredAttributeSelector> element
can be User, Database or Oracle, which indicates where
the required attribute comes from. If the attribute is from
the database, DatabaseId, TableId, and Keys of the table
should be specified for the query.
According to the <RequiredAttributeList> element,
the system will send events to users (i.e., requesters) in-
forming what missing attribute values are required, query
the database to retrieve the attribute values, or query the
oracle for additional information (e.g., whether a disclo-
sure is allowed by other laws). (Note that, for condi-
tion of the rules containing history restrictions we have to
query the history database.) Once responses are obtained
from the users or the database, events carrying informa-
tion about the required attributes will be sent back to the
policy. Therefore, there should exist a way to get the at-
tribute values from the incoming events when checking
<Condition> in policy rules. Hence an <EventSelector>











Attributes: EventType, EventField, DataType
5.4 Attribute Inference Policies
Attribute inference policies specify whether a certain in-
dividual has a specific attribute based on conditions on
his current attributes. Thus, an attribute inference policy
can be viewed as an Oracle which responds with True or
False to queries like “Does user p1 has attribute a1 based
on p1’s current attributes?". Note that, in the context of
distributed authorization Li et al. [13] proposed the RT
language which achieves something similar to what we
propose. However, we propose attribute inference poli-
cies in context of HIPAA and XACML.
To facilitate attribute inference policies,
<Condition> is further extended in a way that
<AttributeInferencePolicyReference> is added into
the substitution group of <Expression> to support
references to attribute inference policies.
<Condition> := <Expression>









The same schema for HIPAA privacy policies pro-
vided by the extended XACML can be reused to specify
this type of attribute inference policies. The only small
difference is that the evaluation results of these policies
are True or False, instead of Permit or Deny.
5.5 Additional Policies
An organization that is interested in enforcing HIPAA
will have some additional policies (i.e., organizational
access control policies and patient policies). We present
these here and show how they fit the big picture of en-
forcing HIPAA. In section 5.6, we present how these
policies are combined with the HIPAA policies.
Organizational Access Control Policies. The HIPAA
privacy regulation mandates what information of a pa-
tient can the covered entity disclose or use and under
what circumstances. However, the covered entity (e.g.,
hospital, clinic, doctor’s office, etc.) might have some
additional access control requirements that further re-
stricts which employees of the covered entity can access
the phi of a certain patient. For instance, a covered entity
might only allow the assigned doctors and the assigned
nurses to access the phi of a certain patient. Thus, even
in the case where HIPAA allows doctors/nurses to use or
disclose the phi of a patient, they will be denied in the
case if they are not the patient’s assigned doctor/nurse.
Patient Policies. Patient policies are those policies spec-
ified by the patients themselves. According to §164.522
of HIPAA, a covered entity can agree or disagree to com-
ply with the patient policy. If the covered entity agrees
to do so, the covered entity must comply with the patient
policy along with the HIPAA policies.
5.6 Policy Combination
HIPAA policy combination. The HIPAA policies can
be organized in the following way. In the top level,
permit-overrides PCA is used to combine two types
of policies: (1) required policies that specify disclo-
sures that are required and must be permitted, such as
§164.502(a)(2)(i); and (2) permitted policies that spec-
ify uses or disclosures that might be permitted, such as
§164.502(a)(1)(i). All required policies are combined
using permit-overrides PCA, while the permitted poli-
cies are combined using deny-overrides PCA. The per-
mitted policies are further divided into allowed poli-
cies, which are combined with permit-overrides PCA,
and prohibitive policies, which are combined using
deny-overrides PCA. Permit-overrides PCA and deny-
overrides PCA are used in most cases, and sometimes
their ordered versions are utilized. Thus the existing
PCAs in XACML are sufficient to combine results of
policy evaluations.
Combining additional policies. A disclosure or usage
request of a covered entity is permitted, when it is al-
lowed by all the policies: the organizational access con-
trol policy, the patient policy (if there is one), and the
HIPAA policies. These policies are combined using the
ordered-deny-overrides PCA. Recall that, ordered-deny-
overrides PCA is the same as deny-overrides PCA, ex-
cept that policies have to be evaluated exactly in the order
they appear. Policies can be arranged in the following or-
der: the access control policy, the patient policy, and the
HIPAA policies. For performance sake, once a policy
denies a request we do not evaluate the policies ordered
after it and simply deny the request.
5.7 Architecture Design
Based on XACML’s architecture and the architecture
presented in [12], we propose an architecture which sup-
ports the enforcement of policies specified in our ex-
tended XACML language. Figure 2 shows our proposed
architecture. The overall system is divided into two parts:
a HIPAA Compliance Checking Component (HCCC),
and an External Environment (EE). The EE is where
applications are executed (e.g., a web-based HIPAA in-
8















































Figure 2: Proposed architecture
formation system), and the HCCC helps the EE decide
whether a usage or disclosure of phi is permitted.
The main components in HCCC include a PEP, a PDP,
a PIP, databases storing policies, attributes, histories, and
logs, respectively, an ORACLE, and a Timer. PEP re-
ceives requests, consults the PDP for a decision, handles
any associated obligations, and makes the final decision
about the request. The PDP evaluates the attribute-based
policy provided by the policy database, and returns, to
the PEP, a PDP decision, together with obligations, if
any. PIP serves as an attribute query point for sub-
jects, resource and environmental attributes, and an in-
formation query point which obtains inputs from users,
histories from the database and additional information
from the Oracle. Attribute database acts as a storage
of subject and object attributes needed in policy evalua-
tions. History database stores history records such as
authorizations or court orders for covered entities. Pol-
icy database stores HIPAA privacy policies, access con-
trol policies, and patient policies. Log database can be
used to keep logs, which leaves a room for auditing in
the future work. The Oracle interacts with the PIP in
a way that the PIP queries the Oracle and gets back a
“Yes/No" (boolean) response. This is necessary for cap-
turing whether a use or disclosure is allowed by other
laws. The Timer informs the PEP that either a specific
time point (e.g., 11:59P.M. on January 27th, 2012; it is
pre-set by the PEP) arrives or a time duration (e.g., 5
minutes; it is pre-set by the PEP) is up.
The EE interacts with the HCCC through an interface,
which include a user interface and zero or more Obliga-
tion Modules. User interface is where users can sub-
mit their requests and obtain whether the requests are
allowed or denied according to HIPAA privacy policies
and other policies. Besides, it will interact with the
PIP via events if user inputs are required during policy
evaluations. Obligation modules implement obligation-
handling functionalities (such as notifying users, and
writing to logs). More details can be referred to [12]. For
XACML to support attribute inference policies, it needs
to be changed so that the policy engine should support
the following feature: while evaluating the original ac-
cess request, the policy generates another request (repre-
senting a question about some attribute) and selects and
evaluates other relevant policies for this new request (for
attribute inference), and then the attribute inference re-
sult will be integrated with other policy to make a deci-
sion about the original request.
6 Related work
May et al. [14] present a formalism, based on HRU ac-
cess control matrix model [7], called Privacy APIs to en-
code HIPAA [8]. They only translate §164.506 of the
2000 and 2003 version of HIPAA in their formalism and
use the SPIN model checker [9] to check different de-
sired invariants of the specification. Roughly, their work
concentrates on specifying privacy policy and its anal-
ysis. Our work on the other hand tries to address the
adequacy of XACML to specify and to enforce HIPAA.
In that sense, their work is complimentary to ours.
Lam et al. [11] propose a formalism, pLogic, based on
a specific fragment of stratified Datalog with one alterna-
tion of negation. They consider the subparts §164.502,
§164.506, and §164.508 of HIPAA. Their specification
language does not support obligations. The goal of the
work of Lam et al. [11] to present a specification lan-
guage and enforcement mechanism for HIPAA. The goal
of our work is on the contrary is to evaluate XACML as
a candidate for specifying and enforcing HIPAA.
Garg et al., [6] propose a privacy policy specification
language based on first order logic. Their specification
language [4, 5] can completely capture the HIPAA pri-
vacy rules. They also present an auditing algorithm that
can detect violations of policies specified in their speci-
fication language. They argue that auditing is necessary
for the enforcement of HIPAA as some of the informa-
tion (e.g., reference to other laws, subjective belief, etc.)
necessary for making decisions cannot be obtained in
runtime. In our work, we assume that the user provides
the necessary information about the purpose and the sub-
jective beliefs. When the same assumption is made, the
auditing algorithm of Garg et al., [6] can be used in an
online fashion to enforce HIPAA. Recall that, the goal of
the current work is not to design a specification language
and its associated enforcement engine to precisely spec-
ify and to enforce the HIPAA privacy rules. The goal
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of our work on the contrary is to evaluate XACML’s ad-
equacy to specify and to enforce HIPAA. In that sense,
their work is complimentary to ours.
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language
(EPAL) [1] is designed to specify organizational privacy
policies. EPAL supports purpose of a disclosure or usage
and also allows obligations to be incurred when an action
is either allowed or denied. However, in EPAL’s policy
rules there is no support for restricting the attributes of
the sender of a information and also the subject of the
information. Furthermore, they do not support past tem-
poral conditions to be added to the condition of a rule.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we evaluate XACML based on the features
proposed by DeYoung et al. [4, 5] and found out that
XACML has some of the necessary features but lacks
some other features. We then present high level designs
to extend the specification language and enforcement ar-
chitecture to support the missing features.
Currently, we do not have a prototype of our approach.
In on-going work, we are extending XACML enforce-
ment engine to support the extensions we have proposed
for the specification of HIPAA.
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